שם הכותב: תאריך: 13 מרץ 2013
tal_shavit
מחקר בנושא 'תחרות טאלוק'

 

שם חבר הסגל: Shavit, Tal.

מחברים נוספים: Chen Cohen.

שנת פרסום: 2012.

פריט ביבליוגרפי:

Cohen, C. and Shavit, T. (2012). Experimental tests of Tullock’s contest with and without winner refunds. Research in Economics, 66(3).

לצפייה במאמר לחץ כאן

תקציר:

We examined experimentally the two-agent, complete-information Tullock’s contest, with and without refund for the winner. We find that the average bids in the refund group are higher than the average bids in the group without a refund, consistent with the theory. However, the auctioneer does not increase his profit if he changes the design of the contest by reimbursing the winner’s cost of effort. We also find underbidding for the low-valuation players and overbidding for the high-valuation player in a contest with a refund. Some players chose the corner solution of staying out of the game by biding zero.

שייך לנושאים: מחקרים, מימון